The computational approach has become an invaluable tool in many fields that are directly rel evant to research in religious phenomena. Yet the use of computational tools is almost absent in the study of religion. Given that religion is a cluster of interrelated phenomena and that research concerning these phenomena should strive for multilevel analysis, this article argues that the computational approach offers new methodological and theoretical opportunities to the study of religion. We argue that the computational approach offers 1.) An intermediary step between any theoretical construct and its targeted empirical space and 2.) a new kind of data which allows the researcher to observe abstract constructs, estimate likely outcomes, and optimize empirical designs. Because sophisticated multilevel research is a collaborative project we also seek to intro duce to scholars of religion some general computational issues, and finally applications that model behavior in religious contexts.
function and its various aptitudes-at the biochemical, information-organiza tional, neurological, psychological, and sociological level, to name the most prominent (Deacon 2003) .
Scholars of religion expose themselves to serious deficiencies when they underestimate the complexity of the systems impacted and implicated by such behaviors. Multilevel analysis of religion must take into account both bottom up and top-down feedback systems that mutually enable and constrain func tioning at proximal and distal locations. Any approach to the study of religion identifies a limited problem space of necessity, but always also at the expense of artificially cutting itself off from other influential systems. The result is inevitably a degree of overreach in what any individual approach can say. An explanation that purports to explain religion without qualifications is there fore naïve. The computational approach offers excellent tools for multilevel analysis in general and as methodological pluralists in the study of religion, we want to advance an argument for the utility of the computational approach in the study of religion.
During the last thirty years there has been an explosion in both use and development of the computational approach. This approach has given the sci entific community a number of modeling possibilities that are hitherto unprecedented (Maki and Thompson 2005) . The study of religion, however, seems to have been somewhat reluctant towards using these possibilities. Up until now we are only aware of a small handful of studies being either based on or integrating the computational approach in probing phenomena that are directly related to religion. While we do not think all studies can or should in principle be carried out by means of the computational approach, we think it is unfortunate that the approach is not more widespread. At the same time we acknowledge that its popularity is as much dependent on proficient modelers as on acceptance and understanding from scholars of religion. This article will argue that it makes good sense to incorporate the computa tional approach into the methodological toolbox of the study of religion. The argument will focus especially on the mediating role of computer models and the status of computationally generated data. To increase understanding of the computational approach, the article will furthermore introduce readers to some of the general methodological issues. Finally the article will review sev eral applications of the computational approach to the study of religion.
II. From Theoretical Space to Empirical Space and Back Again
On an abstract level research consists of constructing a set of empirically moti vated concepts that map onto a set of raw data. However, we often want to move beyond the mere description and categorizing of a data set and explain it in terms of some underlying mechanism. We then build a theory linking the set of concepts with general constructs that can account for a certain relation between the concepts. To make sure that our 'theoretical space' maps onto real world phenomena we explore or test consequences of it on 'empirical space.'
The possible outcomes of the testing can then be used to rebuild or extend the theoretical space. This continuous loop of research can be empowered and extended considerably by the mediating role of computational models and simulations (Winsberg 2001 ).
Before we proceed let us make clear what we mean with a set of concepts that at times will be used more or less interchangeably, namely, computer model, computer simulation, computer modeling, and the computational approach. A computer model is an abstract object, as is any scientific model, but it is instantiated in an operational form by means of algorithms and code.
It has the purpose of aiding our understanding of a given system via scientific methodology. A computer simulation introduces temporal dynamics into a computer model, so the modeled system can be investigated as it evolves dur ing some measurement of time. Computer modeling is the application of computer models and simulations to analyze a given target domain in order to explore and predict what might happen with various actions given the validity of the computer model and simulation's assumptions and simplifications. The computational approach then, is scientific research that primarily utilizes and dependent on computer modeling in understanding and explaining a given target domain. Notice that this is a very broad definition of the computational approach that primarily targets the use of research tools and principles from computer science to guide and implement a scientific research. The definition does however exclude the use of word processing programs, image manipula tion programs, as well as several uses of both qualitative and quantitative anal ysis programs as members of the computational approach. The average user of these programs never has to transform scientific models into algorithms, write simulations in code, let alone interpret program output as predictions that map onto a target domain. Finally, some research areas have a somewhat dif ferent, more theoretical, application of the concept 'computational' that focus on the rule-based or information processing properties of their subject matter, such as computational linguistics or computational neuroscience. In actual scientific praxis however these areas also fall within the computational approach as we define it.
What then is the nature of data generated by simulating behaviors? While we have portrayed simulation as an instrument of great value to scholars in the study of religion, any answer to that question depends on what this instru ment is used for, why a given researcher has turned to modeling in the first place, and what, if any, data the researcher has prior to the modeling exercise.
On the most abstract level, simulation is a useful theory-testing device. Trans lating theoretical constructs into simulations can decide whether a theory is viable as it is currently formulated. More provocatively, and assuming a model is possible based on the theoretical construct it instantiates, the model can offer forecasting data. Just as weather modeling offers forecasts of likely out comes of complex atmospheric variables, so modeling human behavior is similarly complex but susceptible to forecasting. All such models can point the skilled user in directions for more profitable empirical research. It cannot offer predictions in the manner of the hard natural sciences, but it can constrain the design, nature, and scope of empirical investigations that test theory validity.
Simulation data also have a proxy quality. Through the proxy the researcher can observe abstract processes and structures that in most other cases can only be inferred from behavior. Importantly, the proxy is more than just a mere illustration or theoretical invention; it is a real empirical phenomenon, gener ated by the complex interactions of assumptions, modeled data and computa tional architecture. Initially the modeling endeavor implies, even embraces, simplification and explication, in other words reduction, but the proxy is reconstructive. It reassembles the bits and pieces into a new configuration that removes noise and represents core principles of the phenomena under investi gation. Regarding the multilevel analysis, we might take a high level phenom enon, such as religious concept acquisition, generated by some low level mechanisms, for instance neuronal dynamics. We can then try to infer an intermediate level of principles that account for both levels and their interac tion (c.f., O'Reilly and Munakata 2000) . It is exactly this intermediate level that simulation data allows you to observe and perturb in a proxy format, that is, as a stand in for the actual but often elusive principles that our scientific constructs refer to. In other words, the proxy offers a computationally based empirical investigation of how such principles organize processes that connect phenomena on multiple levels.
We believe that the mediating role of the computational approach is impor tant to the methodological and theoretical development of the study of reli gion. It opens new possibilities in the continuous loop between theoretical space and empirical space in terms of both top-down and bottom-up perspec tives. A new kind of data on religion, simulation data, can be used to optimize empirical designs and observe processes that are only indirectly accessible in empirical space. Given the fact that well-designed empirical studies can be costly and often lead to dead-ends or unanticipated difficulties in implemen tation, we suggest that all researchers avail themselves of the data computer modeling provides. In its absence, the risk of false starts, invalid experimental designs, unproductive questions, or unsubstantiated field site selection for the research program only grows. Today many areas of research are highly depen dent on the benefits of computational approach and it seems imprudent to exclude the study of religion from this development.
III. Assumptions, Simplifications, and Predictions
Especially three features of the computational approach are considered prime virtues: Explicit assumptions, precise simplification, and real world predictions.
Assumptions are specified properties, either theoretically or motivated by ad hoc computational reasons that are built into the computer model. Whereas most theories and experimental designs contain tacit assumptions which bias their structure, the assumptions of a computer model have to be explicitly written in code. This feature guarantees a high degree of transparency in com puter modeling and makes it easy to change and explore different ideas. In understanding a computational model it is of utmost importance to pay atten tion to these assumptions. Any sound simulation report typically states such assumptions in the introductory part of an article. If for instance the model in question is a connectionist network there will be a range of general assump tions belonging to that branch of computational psychology typically sum marized in a couple of sentences such as: "... using neurobiologically plausible mechanisms (e.g. the spread of activity among simple processing units along weighted connections) in order to identify the principles that are most relevant to behaviour" (Miller and Cohen 2001: 182) . General assumptions are usu ally supported by the specific branch of computational psychology, but their status can be debatable within the area. Specific assumptions belonging pri marily to the model in question are on the other hand chosen for the imple mentation of the specific system and should be scrutinized thoroughly. Typical examples from our own modeling of such specific assumptions might be the distribution of religiously salient objects in an artificial environment or the ratio of instrumental to ritual actions that the computer simulation processes.
Closely connected to assumptions is the inherent simplification of modeled processes because assumptions often serve the function of simplifying the modeled system. There is a long standing critique of simplification as exercised by the computational approach, especially in the social sciences and the humanities.1 However, we believe that the critique is often generated by a ' This critique is often encountered at conferences, but very little seems to be published on the subject. It is primarily computer modelers that tend to incorporate it into methodological sections of their own publications (e.g. Generally speaking there are two interrelated ways of judging a computer model's success. If one is explicitly modeling data an obvious measure of the model's success is its capacity to make a good data fit. This will naturally lead to an interest in exploring new aspects of the data, which eventually produces real world predictions. For a more theoretically oriented model the essential measure of success is real world predictions. In both cases what we are inter ested in is finding consequences based on the assumption that our model is a valid implementation of a given system Using the extended loop, the real strength of the computational approach is that it enables you to move from an abstract theory to concrete predictions without the need to empirically test every possible prediction of the theory. It cannot be stressed enough that when trying to make sense of the computational approach, one should either look for explicitly stated predictions or consider the real world consequences of the computer generated results. To a certain extent a computer simulation will generate some predictions no matter what, but do they make sense in terms of the simulated system and are they open to empirical falsification? From the modeler's perspective it is always important to consider what kind of predic tions one would expect and preferably how they should be tested.
The three prime virtues of the computational approach can all have a down side, which is probably why they all figure prominently in various critiques. In some cases simplification might transform the system to a degree where it is only recognizable to the modeler. This will often be motivated by computa tional efficiency, which admittedly is extremely important, but at the same time the computer simulation should retain a recognizable structural similar ity with the system it is simulating. In other words, a computer model should be constrained by the relevant problem domain. Another related issue is the willingness to interpret any prediction as relevant to the problem domain, and by extension therefore a confirmation of the model's success. However, these issues are not a necessary part of the computational approach. As a critique they are mainly relevant with reference to particular applications. We urge the reader to take into considerations what has already been said about the scope of computer modeling, before criticizing the computational approach for its insistence on assumption, simplification, and predictions.
IV. Applications in the Study of Religion
While artificial intelligence and cognitive modeling scholars have been build ing computer models of how people acquire beliefs and communicate them to others for at least half a century (Russell and Norvig 1998), most of the early work was focused on individual cognition at the expense of interaction with others-the so called brain in the vat approach. A number of developments in computational (e.g., distributed and multiagent systems (Weiss 1999) ) and social sciences (e.g., situated cognition (Greeno 1989) ) in the 1980s and 1990s led to the development of computational models that could be used to study social phenomenon such as religion (Bainbridge et al. 1994; Epstein and Axtel 1996) . While computational applications of religion still lack widespread use by scholars of religion, a number of pioneering studies have shown the poten tial advantage of this approach. These include studies of how socio-cultural and religious beliefs are created (Doran 1998; Hoffman 2002; Upal 2005a; 2005b; Dow 2008) , how cultural ideas spread in a population (Bainbridge 1995; Epstein 2001; Newman, Barabasi, and Watts 2006) , studies of ritual behavior (Nielbo and Sorensen forthcoming; Kahn and Whitehouse 2010; Hochberg and Whitehouse 2010) , and formation of the social structure of organizations (Prietula, Carley, and Gasser 1998) . In the rest of this section we provide more detail of some of the studies that are most relevant to the scholars of religion.
God from the Machine
For the last two decades, the sociologist of religion, William Sims Bainbridge, has persistently argued for the utility of the computer simulation in the social sciences. Several types of computational structures have been applied by him, including artificial neural networks and cellular automata. Whether one agrees with Bainbridge and Stark's (1985) rational choice theory of religion or not, his importance to the field is indisputable.
More than a decade ago Bainbridge introduced the use of artificial neural networks in the study of religion (Bainbridge 1995) . Based on the Stark and failed and a small penalty was given to the disappointed agents. Finally, the agents learned from an exchange by modifying the weights in their mind's memory registers. By means of a rather idiosyncratic use of modulo arithmetic Bainbridge modeled the emergence of supernatural beliefs in the minds of his agents. Since no one could supply the eternal life reward, an agent could never have a satisfactory exchange of that reward. This prompted the agent to con struct what Bainbridge calls supernatural numbers, which he maps to super natural beliefs in the real world (Bainbridge 1995: 490) .
By means of this elegant social environment of artificial neural networks
Bainbridge managed to explore the Stark and Bainbridge theory and show how two theoretical constructs of the theory (i.e. the subculture evolution model and the psychopathology model) could be modeled by simple computa tional manipulations. Some agents were in a constant state of credulousness, believing that gods are good exchange partners because the agents never get any evidence to the contrary. More prudential agents on the other hand acquired beliefs through communication with other agents following exchanges (Bainbridge 1995: 491) . Both possibilities represent ways in which religion might emerge and be sustained according to Bainbridge. Following the sub culture evolution model: "an intensely interacting group of individuals com mit itself to the attainment of rewards some of which are... impossible to obtain" [e.g. eternal life] (Bainbridge 1995: 492) . Explanations of how to get such rewards are hard to evaluate and can, as a consequence, produce religious beliefs concerning the rewards, finally resulting in religious congregations. The simulation showed how subculture evolution of religion might emerge through a communicative chain, producing agents that in general have a substantial belief in the existence of several gods (Bainbridge 1995: 493) . Contrary to this, religion can originate in the influence of one exceptional individual that, following the psychopathological model, has developed: "supernatural beliefs that will not encounter empirical disconfirmation" (Bainbridge 1995: 492) . In the simulation, such messianic religion emerged when special agents influence different groups, resulting in very divergent religious beliefs between the groups (Bainbridge 1995: 493 ).
Bainbridge's own view of the computational approach is that it can be used as a deductive proof. Based on assumptions from the Stark and Bainbridge theory he can derive theorems in accordance with the theory through an explicit mathematical procedure. We believe that this is a too modest and somewhat restrictive view of the computational approach. Since computer simulations generate data, they are more than engines of formal deduction.
Interesting predictions can be made on the basis of Bainbridge's simulation, for instance that the implemented subculture evolution model tends to gener ate polytheistic-like congregations in contrast to the more monotheistic-like output of the psychopathology model. One might criticize several of the assumptions of the simulation, such as the use of a mentalistic and economic model of religion, but it is important to notice that Bainbridge is very explicit about those. He does not claim that the simulation is a complete model of religion, but instead that given certain assumptions we can explore aspects of religion following from these assumptions.
There are especially three methodological issues that we believe are impor tant in Bainbridge's article. First, he rightfully points out that with unlimited time and computational power he could create a realistic or ecologically valid simulation of interacting humans, but that such is unnecessary for exploring theories. The computer simulation stipulates certain features of the system under scrutiny and by relying on explicit assumptions and mathemati cal manipulations it can model the system in a satisfactory way (Bainbridge 1995: 487) tion, mainly the promise of eternal life. The result of the later runs was that golden-rule-like versions of cooperative strategies tended to succeed better than the alternatives, and this success could be further enhanced by super natural incentives.
Knowledge-rich Agent-based Social Simulation Upal (2005a; 2005b; 2007a; has argued that traditional agent-based social simulation systems assume representations that are too impoverished to result in the emergence of richly interconnected shared beliefs we call religious ideologies. Traditional agent-based social simulation systems are designed based on the keep-it-as-simple-as-possible principle. The idea is that if com plex social patterns can emerge from a simulation employing agents with simple decision making and agent-interaction rules and extremely limited memory (e.g., 1 or 2 bits) then it is easy to compute the causal links between the micro-level cognitive processes and macro-level social patterns. The prob lem is that what makes religious beliefs interesting and religious is the very fact that they are richly connected with other religious and non-religious beliefs.
Such richly connected beliefs cannot emerge from a society of agent whose memory capacity is limited to one-bit (Doran 1998; Epstein 2001) . A refor mulation of traditional agent-based social simulation approaches is needed to allow us to model complex cultural phenomena such as the formation and propagation of religious beliefs (Sun 2008; Upal and Sun 2006) . In order to have complex shared beliefs emerge at the societal level, individual agents need to be able to represent such beliefs and be able to acquire and modify them.
To design predictive computational models we need to design agents that can models cognitive processes of information comprehension, information inte gration/belief revision, and communication. To replicate the experimental result with a more exact measure of predic tion error than button presses, Nielbo and Sorensen used the artificial neural network environment Emergent,4 to train forty simple recurrent networks.5
The networks were trained on two sets of sequential patterns that represented functional and non-functional actions respectively. The networks' task was, when presented with one sub-action of an action pattern, to predict the fol lowing sub-action. Statistical analysis showed that the networks found it much harder to predict the structure of non-functional than functional actions (i.e. they had significantly higher prediction error in the non-functional condi tion). For the study of religion this result is interesting because there are sev eral theories stating that ritualized behavior is highly attention demanding and saturates humans' cognitive resources (Boyer and Liénard 2006; Zor, Keren, Hermesh, Szechtman, Mort and Eliam 2009; Zacks and Sargent 2010) . The 3 'Non-functional' is only meant in proximal terms, that is, in terms of how the action works.
In an ultimate explanatory model proximally non-functional action sequences might serve a range of functions. Several theories claim that action sequences containing ritualized behavior have social functions (Bulbulia 2004; Alcorta and Sosis 2005) .
4 For more information on the neural modeling system Emergent see (Aisa 2008) .
5 A type of artificial neural networks that has successfully been applied to the study of cogni tion in a number of sequential domains, such as language and action processing (Botvinick and increase in prediction error during non-functional actions might be an expla nation for exactly those phenomena.
In the real world we find that information concerning abstract goals of non functional actions is supplied by the socio-cultural context. Although salva tion does not follow directly from the actions involved in the Christian Eucharist, people performing the ritualistic behavior are told by their peers that such and such is the reason why the abstract goal can be obtained. To investigate if abstract goal information decreases prediction error during non functional actions twenty new neural networks were trained by Nielbo and Sorensen. These networks were given abstract information relating to every single action in both sets. Such information is comparable to telling the net works that a particular action has a specific, although not necessarily apparent,
goal. The performance of the networks with abstract information was com pared to those from the previous simulation. The results showed that informa tion concerning an action, independent of its type, lowered prediction error.
However, abstract information seems to be particularly efficient at modulating prediction error in non-functional actions. Interestingly though, the signifi cant difference between non-functional and functional actions remain, that is, independent of abstract information non-functional action elicits a high pre diction error signal. Again, this is interesting to the study of religion because on the one hand prediction error can explain why ritualized behavior is atten tion demanding and on the other hand it can explain the need for reducing the instability caused by prediction error through means of ritual exegesis.
Nielbo and Sorensen predicted that high prediction error during non functional actions results in a fragmented and incoherent representation of non-functional actions. Furthermore, they predicted that abstract informa tion raises the general threshold for environmental updating (i.e. the need to attend to perceptual information). And finally, that in social-cultural context where non-functional actions are considered relevant, such as religious domains, there will be a pressure on transmitting abstract information that can reduce prediction error (Nielbo and Sorensen forthcoming ).
Several explicit assumptions were made in these simulations, first and fore most that non-functional actions are less frequently experienced than func tional actions. This assumption was not tested empirically, but justified in terms of an organism's need for performing functional actions to survive and reproduce. Another assumption, which might seem problematic, was the algo rithm used to train the neural networks. This algorithm is not very biologically plausible, but the authors claimed that it, on a computational level, simulated the brains mechanism for error-based learning.
To increase the simulations realism or ecological validity as it is called in the experimental literature, Nielbo is presently employing a new kind ol data set to train similar recurrent networks. This data set is based on actual human movement transformed into code by a motion capture system. Motion cap ture technology makes it possible to describe postures, or series of postures in the case of action sequences, in a three dimensional coordinate system. If the reproduction succeeds, the networks can then be claimed to process informa tion that shares considerably similarity to human perceptual information.
One especially interesting methodological question is implied by this study, namely, what is the status of output generated by the computational approach?
In trying to mirror the original behavioral study, both in terms of design and analysis, the simulations can be thought of as artificial experiments. In that sense the simulation results constitute a kind of data set. Even though the simulation data is not directly based on human participants, the simulations were capable of reproducing the results of human participants. As mentioned earlier in the article, we do not claim that the simulation data are identical to experimental or field-based data, but this simulation illustrates why output generated by the computational approach is data in its own right. A great advantage of such combined methodology is that an experimental study can be continued in a cheap and efficient manner by proxy, because artificial neu ral networks, as opposed to biological, can be saved on a hard disk. New ques tions might arise following an experimental study, but initiating a new experiment might be too demanding and the relevant predictions not lucid A ritual system that optimizes these dynamics is far more likely to achieve widespread distributions in the minds of adherent to some cultural complex than its rivals.
To explore these claims, Braxton built a landscape made of human minds in Netlogo. (Braxton in press) . These minds came equipped with memory reg isters and finite, but renewable life resources. The memory registers came with only one qualification, a working memory limit of 7 units, a value derived from the so-called chunking behavior studied by psychologists (Bourtchou ladze 2003). Moving about this landscape was a range of rituals with costs correlated impact. The cheapest rituals had the least impact and the most expensive rituals had the greatest impact. At either end of the range of ritual forms, a ritual pushed the limits of human memory constraints: at the lowest end, quick and dirty rituals (imagine Christians' tendency unconsciously to cross themselves for various reasons) and at the highest end, extreme rituals that overload human systems with massive sensory pageantry but no better memory impact than slightly less costly ritual displays. Finally, a slight boost was given to those rituals that conformed to the pattern that cheap rituals underscore human agency directed at a god and expensive rituals dramatize transformative, divine actions on humans.
In this model, rituals wandered randomly competing for the attention of in a report of the state of the culture within the agent's percept range. The agent was then asked to judge the percept report using a Bayesian decision rule. The rule biased the decision-making process so that the more intense the attitude of the agent, the more likely it was to accept confirmatory reports and the less likely it was to embrace reports that violated its basic attitude. The degree of bias was directly tied to its degree of commitment to a positive or negative attitude toward the dominant culture. This process was probabilistic in the truest sense of the word since sometimes agents had to accept the dis confirming evidence based on the roll of a die (a random number generator).
The chances of the die toss requiring cognitive reframing changed incremen tally based on the strength of the agents attitudes.
A second constraint was imposed on the agents called a "Wealth and Edu cation Index" (hereafter WEI). Agents were randomly assigned a WEI reflect ing their educational attainment and wealth within the worlds culture.
Following studies of RMV (Krueger 2008) , this feature reflects the best avail able statistics on persons engaged in ideologically motivated (aka religious) violence. The model assumes no differences between religiously motivated vio lence and violence motivated by other, intense ideological commitments other than the simple assumption of a postulated supernatural agent. In essence, the lower the level of education and wealth, the less likely is an alienated person to embrace ideologies that undertake violence to impact the society. Such pat terns have been empirically established for both secular and religious violence among radical cells. (Krueger 2008) A final dynamic was added to the behavioral repertoire of the agents. If their commitments to positive or negative attitudes toward the dominant cul ture crossed a specific threshold, they began to scan their percept range for other agents with similar attitudes. If some were detected, the agent then began to approach the potential comrade, again judging which to approach using weighted vector analysis. In this way, coalitional structures emerged.
When the model is run, it tracks agents' behaviors on three levels. First, it maintains a running tally of three classes of agents: contents, discontents, and radicals. "Radicals" means here strongly alienated individuals. There are radi cally contented agents, and these might be candidates for a descriptor like "jingoists" or perhaps "nativists," but because they are so positive toward their host culture they are rarely motivated to engage in RMV. Second, it maintains a second tally of the number of contents, discontents, and radicals who have strong religious convictions based on their exposure to the small number of religious tokens cycling through the cultural system. Third, the model main The world of this model is utterly abstract and formal. At every instance the distribution of cultural information and agents is randomized. Although the initial conditions of the agents are seeded, this seeding value is kept to a min imum and not designed to push the model in any direction. In fact, the model is set up to favor positively oriented agents slightly at a rate of approximately 60% to 40% (again, the choice of how close to 60% and how close to 40% is decided by a random number generator). Given all these conditions, it appears relatively easy and predictable that any dominant culture can expect these radicalized groups to form, and when religious elements are represented, as is the case in every known culture to date, some of them will be religious radicals.
But the formal nature of the model makes it largely a heuristic tool. To achieve greater empirical utility, Braxton is now involved in translating these dynamics into a modeling environment that reflects real world measures. Cur rently he is engaged in a study of a specific landscape (the Old City of Jerusa lem), taking biométrie measures (GSR) of the emotional arousal of subjects and plotting these arousal patterns in space and time GPS technology. The groups being studied are exposed to the same cultural elements in the land scape and vary only in their commitments to one of the three Abrahamic monotheisms. 400 subjects over the course of three years will have their emo tional arousal rates mapped into a GIS system creating a small world emo tional map of the Old City of Jerusalem. This map can then be imported into the Netlogo platform and simulations run using the above-described proce dures. Tlius, instead of the cultural tokens being randomly distributed, they will be fixed in space as all such cultural information inevitably is. They will carry values based on the emotional reactions they elicit, and they will be clustered and clumped as all built human landscape actually is. This step adds a level of realism to the model. It also pushes the envelope so that specific predictions are possible. In essence, Braxton predicts that RMV is most likely to occur in those locations where two or more religious orientations experi ence emotional arousal. By comparing this prediction with historical records of RMV events, the researcher can now test the model. Further, if the model passes that kind of test, it can then wager novel predictions about what might happen in the future. This kind of forecasting is, of course, the gold standard in the scientific study of religion. To date, it has been highly elusive.
V. Conclusion
With this article we have tried to supply an introduction to the computational approach and show various possibilities it has to offer the study of religion. The presented material is by no means exhaustive of possible applications of computer modeling to religious phenomena, but reflects our own experience in the field. We have for instance left out the issue of integrating text-based methods with computational tools. We cannot see any reason why our claims should not apply to such methods, but we have not been offered the opportu nity to bring the computational approach in that direction yet.
Given that religion is a cluster of interrelated phenomena and research con cerning it should strive for multilevel analysis, we have argued for the utility of the computational approach. Both in terms of methodology and theory, the study of religion can benefit from the mediating role of computational space and the type of data that the computer generates (i.e. simulation data). In its function as a mediator the computational approach explores and operational izes relations and objects from theoretical and empirical space. The approach enables a more qualified understanding of the interaction between theoretical constructs and data in a cheap and efficient way, by extending the continuous loop of scientific research. The computational approach allows the researcher easily to work from fixed features of observed phenomena and then infer what is possible and probable but hidden in the modeled system. This is demon strated by the somewhat unusual concept of simulation data that offer a proxy through which the researcher can observe abstract processes. More so, simula tion data also affords forecasting that can point the researcher to likely out comes of human behavior given known parameters and thus, refine experimental field designs. Data having such qualities represent invaluable guidelines for research whether the perspective is top-down or bottom-up.
Viewed from the top-down, simulation data offer the researcher information for optimizing the process of moving theory into the field or lab. Simulation data can also from a bottom-up perspective guide in theory building by explor ing structures that does not conform to expectations or by asking new ques tions to an empirical data set assuming that the model is a good fit. Examples of both perspectives were given in the preceding section, for instance Bain bridge's use of artificial neural networks as a deductive proof of the Stark and
Bainbridge theory or both Braxton's and Nielbo and Sorensen's efforts to use computer simulations as empirical tools. In reality there is a constant interac tion between these two perspectives because asking new questions to data inevitably leads to modifications of theoretical space that then generates pre dictions that can and should be tested on empirical space.
Our motivation for writing this article has primarily been to initiate a dia logue between scholars of religion and computer modelers interested in reli gious phenomena. On all levels of description we are really talking about the same larger scientific entity. All research involves cyclic sharing of results among theoreticians, computer modelers, and experimentalists. Ideally, a sci entific team will include people well suited to various kinds of expertise work ing in conjunction and in full recognition that each does her or his job better because of the impact of the other domains. The computational approach can in terms of technical demands be quite time consuming which tends to bias the modeler in the direction of their models sometimes at the cost of the sys tem that is modeled. It can therefore be of utmost importance to have both creative input and collaboration with insightful researchers in the study of religion and its adjacent fields.
